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Former corporate managers, fiduciary obligations, and 
the public policy in favor of competition 
Bruce WELLING* 
In common law sytstems corporate managers owe fiduciary obliga-
tions to their corporations. This has complicated the legal analysis of 
competitive business activities by former corporate managers, par-
ticularly since the 1974 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Canaero. 
Other former corporate employees have long been allowed to compete 
with their ex-employers, so long as they do not use their ex-employers' 
property or breach terms of any contracts restraining their business 
activities. Attempts to contract to restrain future competitive business 
activities have long been restricted by the public policy in favor of 
competition. 
Former corporate managers can also be sued in Equity : the remedy 
is for an accounting of profits or for equitable damages. The judicial 
analysis of these equitable actions has been mystified by the "corporate 
opportunity doctrine" and the mistaken notion that a fiduciary obligation 
can survive resignation from the fiduciary position that created the 
obligation. A review of the basics exposes the errors and shows that 
equitable accounting and equitable damages remedies are also subject to 
the public policy in favor of competition, but that the calculation is more 
complicated than in contracts. 
En vertu de la common law, les dirigeants d'une corporation ont des 
devoirs fiduciaires envers celle-ci. Plus particulièrement depuis l'arrêt de 
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la Cour suprême dans l'affaire Canaero, rendu en 1974, cette situation a 
compliqué l'analyse juridique des activités exercées par les anciens 
dirigeants d'une corporation qui sont en concurrence avec cette dernière. 
On a depuis longtemps permis à d'anciens employés d'une corporation de 
livrer concurrence à leur ancien employeur, à la condition qu'ils 
n'utilisent pas les biens de la corporation, ni n'enfreignent des obliga-
tions contractuelles de non-concurrence. Quant aux tentatives de limiter 
la concurrence ultérieure, l'application du concept d'ordre public, 
favorable à la libre concurrence, a conduit depuis longtemps à une 
interprétation restrictive des dispositions contractuelles de cette nature. 
Selon les principes de /'Equity, // est aussi possible de poursuivre les 
anciens dirigeants de corporations en vue d'obtenir une reddition de 
comptes ou des dommages-intérêts. La corporate opportunity doctrine 
n'a fait qu'embrouiller l'analyse juridique de ces recours ; il en a été de 
même de l'utilisation de cette conception erronée voulant qu'une 
obligation de nature fiduciaire existe après la démission de la fonction qui 
lui a donné naissance. Cette étude critique des interprétations jurispru-
dentielles ; elle vise à démontrer que les recours fondés sur /'Equity sont 
également assujettis à l'application du concept d'ordre public, qui 
favorise la concurrence, mais que, par ailleurs, l'évaluation du préjudice 
subi est plus difficile qu'en matière contractuelle. 
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1. The problem 
1.1. Runaway fiduciary obligations 
The time has come to rein in runaway fiduciary duties. 
The area most wanting sober review is the accountability of former 
corporate managers who compete with their ex-employers. Most of them 
aren't accountable on the basis of fiduciary theory at all. Some of them 
may be, but the courts have so far ignored a rather obvious limit on the 
extent of their potential liability. 
1.2. Genesis and exodus 
Things were manageable in the days when fiduciary duties began to 
be required of trustees. Trustees were easily identifiable — they held 
property in land (or in things) according to the rules of common law, but 
had undertaken to hold the property for the benefit of someone else, often 
a child or a woman subject to impediment of marriage. Their legal 
obligations were easily understood. In the common law law courts, they 
had none : a trustee was at liberty to behave like any other holder of 
property. Equity, however, had different property rules and Equity 
judges expected holders of common law property to heed the dictates of 
religious mores. In the Chancellor's court a trustee could be assisted in 
doing so by hints of extra-terrestrial intervention and, for the more 
recalcitrant, thumbscrews. Things were a lot simpler in the days when the 
Chancellor was a priest, the populace at least pretended to subscribe to 
shared religious ideals, and priests could plausibly damn the unconcion-
able to hellfire or rack them to salvation. 
Things were still comprehensible when the traditional licensed pillars 
of the community — doctors, lawyers, bankers, priests, etc. — were 
included as fiduciaries. This required them to dispense advice with due 
regard for the fact they were not dealing with customers of equal 
bargaining power, but with trusting souls who were dazzled by their 
credentials and hung on their every word. Corporate directors too were 
obvious fiduciaries — not because their corporations were in awe of them, 
but because of the raw power they wielded over every aspect of corporate 
life. 
Things began to get out of control when Bora Laskin opined that 
fiduciary obligations owed by "senior" corporate officers continued to 
exist after their resignations1. Things stopped making sense temporarily 
1. Canadian Aero Services Ltd. v. O'Malley, [1974] S.C.R. 592, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371 
(S.C.C.). I shall have more to say on this point later. 
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when Lac Minerals Ltd. were determined by the Ontario courts to have 
owed International Corona Resources Ltd. a fiduciary obligation because 
they were "intending partners" (intending ??) and because of a so-called 
"practice" in the mining industry2. The Supreme Court of Canada tried to 
put a stop to the fiduciary bandwagon at the final appeal3, but time will tell 
whether they succeeded. 
1.3. Leviticus, and unruly horses 
The sprawl of accountability for breach of fiduciary obligation is 
contrary to public policy. 
"Public policy" is, in law, a minimal set of basic rules, not a 
dictatorial state of mind. I am no advocate of judicial fiat couched in the 
rhetoric of statesmanship. But there are some simple canons judges can't 
ignore. There are underlying principes so basic to our system of 
government that they must be invoked whenever the application of a 
lesser rule would offend them. There is danger in over-application of 
these principles, yet there is sometimes more to be lost when they are 
forgotten. The problem lies not in whether judges are to apply them, but 
how. 
Lors Denning said something uncommonly wise (and characteris-
tically picturesque) about public policy in 19714. 
1 know that over 300 years ago Hobart, CJ said that "Public policy is an unruly 
horse". It has often been repeated since. So unruly is the horse, it is said... that 
no judge should ever mount it lest it run away with him. I disagree. With a good 
man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump over 
obstacles. It can leap the fences put up by fictions and come down on the side of 
justice. ... It can hold a rule to be invalid even though it is contained in a contract. 
It is time to prefer the unruly horse of public policy to the stampede of 
fiduciary obligations. The particular horse I have in mind is the public 
policy in favor of competition. 
2. International Corona Resources Ltd. v. Lac Minerals Ltd., (1986) 32 B.L.R. 15 (Ont. 
H.C.) at p. 65 ff., aff md (1987) 62 O.R. (2d) 1, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 592 (Ont. CA.) . Would 
this mean that because other people in a particular business usually do things in a certain 
way, you can't act like a normal competitor? What next? Perhaps a people's shop 
steward, preferably one with a Scottish accent, could be stationed at every used car lot 
to proclaim at regular intervals "yer not bargainin' in gud faith". 
3. International Corona Resources Ltd. v. Lac Minerals Ltd., (1989) 44 B.L.R. 1 (S.C.C.). 
I shall deal with the case in more detail later. 
4. Enderley Town Football Club v. Football Association [1971] 1 Ch. 591 (Eng.), citing 
Burrough, J. in Richardson v. Mellish, ( 1824) 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 E.R. 294 (Eng.) who 
warned : "It [public policy] may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all 
but when other points fail". 
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2. The public policy in favor of competition 
The common law provinces inherited a system of law that favors 
competition in commercial matters. Common law courts have tradition-
ally referred to "the public policy against restraint of trade". A classic, 
old-fashioned recitation of the policy can be found in The Case of the 
Tailors & Co. of Ipswich5. 
[A]t the common law, no man could be prohibited from working in any lawful 
trade, for the law abhors idleness, the mother of all evil... and especially in young 
men, who ought in their youth, (which is their seed time) to learn lawful sciences 
and trades, which are profitable to the commonwealth, and whereof they might 
reap the fruit in their old age, for idle in youth, poor in age ; and therefore the 
common law abhors all monopolies, which may prohibit any from working in any 
lawful trade... so if a husbandman is bound that he shall not sow his land, the 
bond is against the common law... [The rules of the tailors guild] are against the 
liberty and freedom of the subject, and are a means of extortion in drawing 
money from them, either by delay, or some other subtle device, or of oppression 
of young tradesmen, by the old and rich of the same trade, not permitting them 
the work in their trade freely ; and all this is against the common law and the 
commonwealth. 
Note the orientation. The bias is pro-individual, anti-organization. To the 
extent that collective interests are to be protected, they are the interests 
of the entire collective ("the commonwealth"). Don't be tricked by the 
limited vision of members of a sub-collective who monopolize a trade in 
order (so they say) to benefit us all. 
The "interests of the collective" really means nothing more than the 
collective interests of individuals within the society. We can't calculate 
that by adding up the individual interests of all the individuals : they 
conflict. Consequently, our legal system imposes compromises. More-
over, time and money incline us to characterize interests by type, rather 
than trying to estimate each minor variant in taste or prejudice. We seek 
to characterize the self-interest of a rational hypothetical person of each 
type. What we require of judges — who decide whose interests are to be 
compromised, and when — is a careful consideration of all the types of 
interests involved. 
When former corporate managers compete with their ex-employers, 
four types of interests warrant consideration. A rational ex-employer 
would hope to limit direct competition. A former manager would seek to 
capitalize on his experience and marketable talent. Potential employers 
would like to rent the experience and talent. Clients, past and future, want 
what the manager can manage to produce at the lowest possible price. 
5. In the Case of the Tailors & Co of Ipswich, (1614) 11 Co.Rep.53a, 77 E.R. 1218 (Eng.). 
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The case of a former manager who joins a competitor invokes all four 
types of interests. The case of a former manager who seeks to compete on 
his own may appear superficially different, as potential employers see 
themselves as both competitors and future ex-employers of managers 
who might do the same. But the legal analysis can't be different. 
Otherwise, the public policy in favor of competition would become biased 
against new competitors in the marketplace. 
Rules inhibiting the competitive activities of former managers arise 
from two sources. One is contract. The other is fiduciary obligation. 
3. Former managers and contractual obligations 
3.1. The rule 
3.1.1. Theory 
A contract is accurately described as a promise enforceable by legal 
action. By contrast, the word agreement describes any manifestation by 
two (or more) persons of mutual assent to a proposition. An agreement 
may or may not create legal obligations. A contract, by definition, does. 
Parties negotiating a contract often reach agreement on many details. 
Not all agreed terms become contractual terms. A trite example would be 
an agreement to have lunch during the negotiations : either party remains 
at liberty to make other lunch arrangements as neither would be able to 
prove that lunch was what they were attempting to contract about6. An 
equally simple issue arises when parties agree to commit a crime. No one 
can stop two people from agreeing to murder someone, but the legal 
system will not order anyone to carry out the agreement or to pay 
damages for violating it. The rationality of this conclusion is variously 
explained7, but it is most easily stated in plain speech — a promise to 
commit a crime may well be a term of an agreement, but it can not be a 
term of a contract. 
6. "When it is said that contract is founded upon promises and upon agreement about 
promises, this must be understood as subject to the qualification that the promises, and 
the agreement, are designed and intended to have legal effect" : G.H.L. Fridman, The 
Law of Contract, 2d. ed., Toronto, Carswell, 1986, p. 6 and "When is a statement a 
term?" at p. 429. Similarly, see S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 2d. ed., 
Toronto, Canada Law Book, 1984, p. 115 "Social Engagements and Jests". 
7. See, for example, G.H.L. Fridman, supra, note 6, p. 353: "Thus, a contract to 
undertake broadcasting, when it was illegal to do so by reason of a failure to obtain the 
necessary licence, was held void...". Compare S.M. Waddams, supra, note 6, p. 421 : 
"Courts have often held that such agreements are void and unenforceable", [emphasis 
added] 
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To the extent that there is a public policy in favor of competition, 
competition cannot be limited by contract. The reason is the same as in 
the cases of casual lunch arrangements and criminal conspiracies. Public 
policy is, by nature, legally enforceable. A contract is, by definition, 
legally enforceable. It follows that a promise that is contrary to public 
policy and therefore not legally enforceable could not possibly be a term 
of a contract. 
It is unlikely that the public policy in favor of competition is absolute. 
Some agreements that restrict competition are enforceable. My contract 
to show up for class at Western as scheduled next week is undoubtedly 
one of them. The fact that I might prefer to play poker instead is no 
defence. It is true that competition is lessened : the more skilful players at 
the poker table are deprived of the opportunity to fleece me of my money ; 
my students are deprived of the opportunity to bargain for real pearls of 
wisdom8. Yet the degree to which competition is lessened is insufficient to 
warrant invocation of the public policy in favor of competition. 
By contrast, an attempt to contract to restrict competition to an 
excessive degree will fail because it is illegal, and therefore impossible. 
Any such term may well be part of an agreement between an employer 
and a manager, but it can not be a term of their contract. 
3.1.2. Practice 
The courts have consistently applied the theory. 
A non-competition clause in an agreement between a corporate 
manager and his corporation (or between any employer and employee) 
can not be a term of their contract if it is excessively wide in geographical 
application or too long in duration. The Supreme Court of Canada put it 
thus9 : 
the principles to be applied in considering restrictive convenants of employment 
are well-established. ... A covenant in restraint of trade is enforceable only if it is 
reasonable between the parties and with reference to the public interest. 
The terminology used byjudges is sometimes arcane. They seem to prefer 
mysterious words like "convenants" and self-contradictory phrases like 
"void contracts". But the underlying message is clear. Corporate 
8. One of the gentlemen I used to work with described professing law as "the art of casting 
false pearls before real swine". I have often wondered which side of his cast was 
caricature, and which satire. 
9. Elsley v. J.G. Collins Ins. Agencies, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 916, p. 923. For a recent case in 
which an agreed term was rejected because of its geographical scope, see Reed 
Stenhouse Ltd. v. Foster, (1989) 69 Alta. L.R. (2d) 80 (Alta. Q.B.). 
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managers can be employed, but they can't be enslaved ; their services can 
be rented, but they can't be kept out of the marketplace forever. 
3.2. The reason for the rule 
It is perfectly clear that the reason for the rule is the public policy in 
favor of competition. 
Agreements to refrain from future competitive activity have long 
been part of the hiring process for both managerial and non-managerial 
personnel. Attempts to preclude the future use of an employee's labor, 
technical, or managerial skills have routinely been struck down by the 
courts. The public policy in favor of competition (or, as judges often refer 
to it, the public policy against restraint of trade) has routinely been given 
as the reason. An oft-quoted 1916 English case summarizes the judicial 
attitude10. 
Public policy requires that every man shall be at liberty to work for himself and 
shall not be at liberty to deprive himself or the State of his labour, skill, or talent, 
by any contract that he enter into. ...[A] contract is an embargo upon the 
energies and activities and labour of a citizen ; and the public interest coincides 
with his own in preventing him, on the one hand, from being deprived of the 
opportunity of earning his living, and in preventing the public, on the other, from 
being deprived of the work and service of a useful member of society. 
Both the rule and the reason for the rule are uncontroversial". 
3.3. Applying the rule 
Like most legal rules, this one is simpler to state than apply. 
However, some pretty clear principles of interpretation have been 
established. I propose to review them briefly. This will lay the foundation 
for my main point, which is that the same rule and the same principles of 
interpretation apply to the fiduciary obligation owed by departing 
corporate mangers. 
The rule clearly covers the future use of physical and mental skills. 
As noted in Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby12, no one can be contractually obliged 
"to deprive himself or the State of his labour, skill, or talent" except 
within the narrow range of limitations allowed. 
10. Morris Lid. v. Saxelby, [1916] 1 A.C. 688 (Eng. H.L.) per Lord Atkinson at p. 701 and 
p. 708. 
11. See generally R.A. Brait, "The Use of Restrictive Covenants in the Employment 
Contract", (1981) 6 Queen s L.J. 414. 
12. Morris Lid. v. Saxelby, supra, note 10. Any textbook on the law of contracts will 
confirm this uncontroversial point. 
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However, the rule has no application to property. Contract is one of 
the most common transactions by which property is acquired. Property, 
once acquired, may be retained and protected from intruders without 
regard to time or georgraphical scope13. Property in things provides the 
simplest illustration. A person who sells ownership of a dog cannot 
invoke public policy and reclaim ownership after a "reasonable" time, or 
retake possession if the dog is found to have strayed beyond a 
"reasonable" distance from its new home. The situation is the same, and 
equally obvious, in the case of patents. An inventor who develops a new 
process and acquires a patent has secured state protection from 
replication of the process for the period of years set by statute. The patent 
can be sold to a "licence", who will get the same state protection from 
third parties. The original holder of the patent may prefer inventing to 
manufacturing. It is not contrary to the public policy in favor of 
competition for the original holder of the patent to contract away his own 
rights to replicate the process. This very point was noted in Morris, Ltd. 
v. Saxelby[4. 
On the other hand, public policy requires that when a man has by skill or by any 
other means obtained something he wants to sell, he should be at liberty to sell it 
in the most advantageous way in the market ; and in order to enable him to sell it 
advantageously in the market it is necessary that he should be able to preclude 
himself from entering into competition with the purchaser. 
A transfer of property, unlike a promise to retire from business, can be 
forever. The principle is the same whether property in a thing (like a dog, 
or a car) is involved or property other than property in things is being 
protected. The latter type of property — including patents, trademarks, 
copyright and all the other forms of property recognized by law but not 
directly concerned with possession of a physical object—is commonly 
labelled choses in action by otherwise English speaking legal analysts. 
Both types of property can be protected, despite the public policy in favor 
of competition : the only distinction is that it is harder to recognize a 
proprietary claim in the latter category because of the foggy way common 
lawyers talk. 
13. Except where the property itself expires over time — as in the case of an option to 
purchase corporate shares at a set price before a specified deadline — or where the 
property holder seeks to enforce claims in another state that may have different 
property rules. 
14. Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby, supra, note 10, per Lord Atkinson, p. 701. By contrast, "[i]nthe 
case of restraints upon the opportunity to a workman to earn his livelihood, a different 
set of considerations comes into play. No actual thing is sold or handed over by a 
present to a future possessor." [p. 708]. 
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A 1920 English case summarized the distinction between attempted 
contractual restraints on trade and property claims as follows15. 
The employer's goodwill is always necessarily subject to the competition of all 
persons, including the employee, who choose to engage in a similar trade. The 
employer in such a case is not endeavouring to protect what he has, but to gain a 
special advantage he could not otherwise secure. Accordingly convenants 
against competition by a former servant are as such not upheld ; and the 
permissible extent of any covenant imposed upon a servant must be tested in 
every case with reference to the character of the work done for the employer by 
the servant while in his service and by the consideration whether in that view the 
covenant taken from him goes further than is reasonably necessary for the 
protection of the proprietary rights of the covenantee, [emphasis added] 
Thus, an ex-employer can protect property, however acquired, 
but former employees who compete without interfering with the 
ex-employer's property are protected by the public policy in favor of 
competition. 
The technique by which courts impose the public policy limitation 
can be stated bluntly. Without telling us exactly how many months of 
enforced idleness would be the maximum allowed by the public policy in 
favor of competition, the judge says whether the agreed term is under or 
over the maximum. Without specifying the maximum geographical area 
that could possibly be covered by a contractual term without violating the 
public policy in favor of competition, the judge says whether the agreed 
term is under or over the maximum16. Agreed terms under the maximum 
are enforced ; agreed terms over the maximum are typically said to be "of 
no force and effect". 
We already know why. Agreements aren't legally enforceable unless 
they are contracts. The issue is whether the parties' agreed terms limiting 
competition are contractual terms. They are so long as they comply with 
the public policy in favor of competition. They can't be terms of a 
contract, and they create no contractual obligation, if they don't comply. 
15. Attwood v. Lamont, [1920] 3 K.B.D. 571 (Eng. CA.), p. 590 per Younger L.J. 
16. This is the standard process by which common law courts have always proceeded when 
dealing with non-statutory rules. Once any common law rule is stated, a spectrum of 
possibilities can be visualized. Consider the tort of battery, intentional physical 
interference with the person. Deliberately striking a defenceless bystander with an ax 
constitutes battery. At the other end of the spectrum, accidentally brushing against a 
fellow passenger on a crowded bus is not. Somewhere is the middle of the spectrum is a 
gray area ; somewhere in the gray area is the precise line dividing the spectrum into tort 
and non-tort. Judges occasionally narrow the gray area, but only by telling us which side 
of the still hidden dividing line the facts of the case fall on. 
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The effect is simple. No compromise is possible in the judge's ruling 
on an agreed restraint of trade clause. If the parties agreed to 18 months of 
non-competition within the province of Prince Edward Island and that is 
found to be permitted by public policy, then a breach of the term is 
compensable by up to 18 months worth of damages. Whether they could 
have contracted for 24 months of non-competition is a red herring : they 
didn't. On the other hand, if the parties agreed to 36 months of non-
competition within the province of Newfoundland and that is found not to 
be permitted by public policy, then there is no contractual term to 
enforce. Whether they could have contracted for 24 months of non-
competition is a red herring : they didn't contract any non-competition 
term, so no breach of contract has occurred. 
3.4. Summary : contract and public policy 
The public policy in favor of competition is well established. So is its 
application to employer/employee agreements restraining future competi-
tion. In fact, the association between the two is so familiar that the public 
policy is sometimes mistaken for a rule of contract : it is more basic than 
that. 
I emphasize the basics because they will resurface during my 
comments or» the fiduciary obligations of former corporate managers. My 
thesis is that lawyers defending equitable claims often ignore the 
underlying principles. Consequently, they make some big mistakes. Four 
key points arise from the analysis so far. 
(i) Private agreements would not be enforceable at all but for the general 
law of contracts which was judicially developed in the common law. 
(ii) Agreements to refrain from using one's physical and mental skills in 
future competition with one's former employer are not legally 
enforceable except within narrow limitations of duration and geogra-
phical area. 
(iii) The reason is not peculiar to the common law of contracts ; rather, 
the reason is the overriding effect of the public policy in favor of 
competition. 
(iv) Both the rule and the reason for the rule are uncontroversial and a 
settled part of our law. 
4. Former managers and Fiduciary obligations 
Corporate managers — directors and officers — owe fiduciary obliga-
tions to their corporations. The concept of fiduciary obligation was 
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developed over the centuries by courts of Equity17. It was extended to 
corporate directors because they occupied positions which gave them 
legal powers which were intended to be used for the sole benefit of 
someone else — the corporation18. It was later extended to corporate 
officers, first by judicial extrapolation19 and later by statute20. 
It is often said that former corporate managers continue to owe 
fiduciary obligations to their corporations after they resign21. This is 
difficult to understand. Once the position which gave a former corporate 
manager legal powers over the corporate destiny no longer exists, doesn't 
the obligation imposed because of that position of legal power cease as 
well ? What the courts are trying to explain when they say the fiduciary 
relationship continues is how a former corporate manager remains 
accountable on the basis of fiduciary obligation for certain competitive 
activities after resigning. That can be understood by examining the 
reasons for fiduciary accountability. 
It is easy for a fiduciary to make a profit. Outsiders wanting to do 
business with a corporation must deal through corporate managers who 
have the legal power to make corporate decisions; those wanting to deal 
17. The judicial attitude to someone found to occupy a fiduciary position was admirably 
summed up by Cardozo, C.J. in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. CA., 1928). 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at 
arm's length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. ...Not honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honour the most sensitive, is then the standard of 
behaviour. As to this, there has developed a tradition that is unbending and 
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity 
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disinte-
grating erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct 
for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. 
18. Directors were recognized as fiduciaries for their corporations well before the 
20th century began. The rule was summed up in Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. 
Craddock, [1968] 2 All E.R. 1073 (Eng.): "Directors are clearly not trustees: ...they 
have business to conduct and business functions to perform in a business manner. 
[However] their powers, duties and functions qua directors are fiduciary for and on 
behalf of the company." 
19. "Senior officers" of corporations were held to owe fiduciary obligations to their 
corporations in Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley, supra, note 1. 
20. See eg. the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-44 s. 122 (l)(a): 
"Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising his powers and discharging his 
duties shall (a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
corporation...". Similar sections are found in most provincial corporate statutes and are 
generally accepted in the common law provinces as a statutory imposition of fiduciary 
obligation. 
21. See, eg. Edgar T. Alberts Ltd. v. Mountjoy, (1977) 16 O.R. (2d) 682, p. 691 per Estey, 
C.J. : "the ex-employee defendants owed a duty to their former employer which 
transcended the severance of the employee — employer relationship". 
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with a wealthy child must negotiate with a trustee appointed to hold 
property on the child's behalf. It is up to the fiduciary to determine 
whether it is in the corporation's or the child's interests to accept the 
outsider's offer. Sometimes the fiduciary decides that it is not and decides 
to reject the offer. In such a situation, it would be easy to persuade the 
outsider that while the offer could not be taken up by the corporation, or 
on behalf of the child, the fiduciary was willing to accept it on his own 
behalf. 
A fiduciary who does so, and profits as a result, is accountable22. 
Note that such a deal would not necessarily be a violation of the 
fiduciary's equitable obligations: the corporation might, for various 
reasons, be unable to exploit the business opportunity23 ; the terms of the 
trust might not permit the type of investment proposed24. Nevertheless, 
accountability is imposed. Lord Chancellor Eldon explained why in 
180325. 
The doctrine as to purchases by trustees, assignees, and persons having a 
confidential character, stands much more upon general principle than upon the 
circumstances of any individual case. It rests upon this : that the purchase is not 
permitted in any case however honest the circumstances ; the general interests of 
justice requiring it to be destroyed in every instance ; as no court is equal to the 
examination and ascertainment of the truth in much the greater number of cases. 
In short, accountability for profits is imposed on a particular fiduciary 
pour encourager les autres. 
The underlying reason is a common one. Any legal system would 
break down but for the fact that most people comply with most laws 
22. The rule dates at least as far back as Keech v. Sandford, (1726) Sel. Cas. Ch. 61 (Eng.), 
in which the ruling was even more severe. A lease, held by a trustee for the benefit of a 
child, expired. The trustee sought a renewal, but was refused, so he took a lease for his 
own benefit. He was ordered to assign the lease to the benefit of the child. Lord King, 
L.C. noted (p. 62): 
This may seem hard, that the trustee is the only person of all mankind who 
might not have the lease ; but it is very proper that the rule should be strictly 
pursued and not in the least relaxed. 
He also pointed out that if a trustee who was refused renewal of a lease might have the 
benefit for himself, few renewals would be made in trust ! 
23. That was what happened in two well-known cases, Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, 
[1942] 1 All E.R. 378 (Eng. H.L.), in which the corporation lacked the financing 
required, and Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. (I.D.C.) v. Cooley, [1972] 2 All 
E.R. 162 (Eng), in which the outsider thought the corporation incapable of carrying out 
the project. The fiduciaries made personal profits, and were held accountable for their 
profits, in both cases. 
24. This occurred in Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 A.C. 46, [1966] 3 All E.R. 721 (Eng. 
H.L.). The trustee and another investor profited without prejudicing the beneficiaries 
under the trust in any way, yet were held accountable for their profits. 
25. Ex parte James, (1803) 8 Ves. 337, 32 E.R. 385 (Eng.). 
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voluntarily. Human nature inclines voluntary compliance to be directly 
proportional to risk, inversely proportional to potential reward. The high 
degree of control exercised by a fiduciary minimizes risk, but greatly 
increases temptation. Equity — having abandoned therapeutic torture and 
convalescence in purgatory — helps resist the temptation by reducing the 
chance of reward26. 
4.1. Fiduciary accountability: the rule 
The accountability rule started out on a simple basis. A fiduciary's 
duty was to serve the interests of someone else. If a situation arose in 
which duty and self-interest might conflict, the duty might be com-
promised. Any fiduciary who made a profit in such a situation was 
accountable for the profit to the person to whom the fiduciary duty was 
owed27. The profit, if sued for, would be taken away. 
The rule has undergone some subtle changes during the 20th century. 
First, it is no longer true that the mere possibility of conflict of duty and 
interest will trigger the accounting remedy : if it is proved that no real 
conflict was involved, the fiduciary can keep the profit28. Second, the 
rhetoric has shifted : plaintiffs now routinely assert that the fiduciary 
absconded with a "corporate opportunity"29. 
26. It does not appear to me that this rule is... founded upon principles of morality. 
I regard it rather as based on the consideration that, human nature being what it 
is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary 
position being swayed by interest rather than duty, and thus prejudicing those 
whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, been deemed expedient to lay 
down this positive rule. 
Bray v. Ford, [1896] A.C. 44 at p. 51-52 (Eng.H.L.) per Lord Herschell. 
27. In Aberdeen Railway Co. v. Blaikie Bros., (1854) 1 Macq. 461 (Scot.H.L.) it was said 
that "no one having such duties to discharge shall be allowed to enter into such 
engagements in which he has or can have a personal interest conflicting or which may 
conflict with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect". Inconsequentalist 
rules like this are of little use, except to describe situations that may give rise to some 
consequences. Keech v. Sandford, supra, note 22, was an early example of the 
consequences. 
28. This is probably the rationalization for Peso Silver Mines Ltd. v. Cropper, [1966] S.C.R. 
673, 58 D.L.R. (2d) 1 ( S C O , in which it was "impossible to say that the respondent 
obtained the interests he holds... by reason of the fact that he was a director of the 
appellant and in the course of the execution of that office". It was also the reason for 
denying accountability in Holder v. Holder, [1968] Ch. 353 (Eng. CA.) It remains, 
however, difficult for a fiduciary to prove that there really was no conflict : see 
Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. (I.D.C.) v. Cooley, supra, note 23. 
29. The "corporate opportunity doctrine" has been all the rage since the 1974 Supreme 
Court of Canada decision in Canadian Aero Services Ltd. v. O'Malley, supra, note 1. 
I shall have more to say about it later. 
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Former corporate managers are now held accountable for profit 
when either : 
(i) a conflict between self-interest and fiduciary duty led to the situation 
in which the profit was made ; or 
(ii) the opportunity to make the profit can be attributed to the fiduciary 
position formerly occupied. 
Given those rules30, what about the public policy in favor of 
competition ? How is the public policy applied when former corporate 
managers are held accountable ? 
4.1.1. Theory 
Public policy sets an upper limit on the amount of profit for 
which any former corporate manager can be held accountable to an 
ex-employer. No ex-employer is entitled to profits earned outside a 
geographical area or after a period of time that is "reasonable in the 
circumstances". 
In calculating the upper limit in each case, four types of interests 
warrant consideration. These are precisely the same for types of interests 
identified earlier : (i) ex-employers (who hope to limit direct competition) ; 
(ii) former managers (who seek to capitalize on their experience and 
marketable talent) ; (iii) potential employers (who would like to rent the 
experience and talent), and (iv) past and future clients (who want what 
managers can manage to produce at the lowest possible price). 
A proper equitable analysis must take account of all four types. The 
reason is the same as in the case of contracts. A corporate manager would 
owe no equitable or contractual obligations to the corporation at all but 
for the agreement by which he became a manager. No agreement can 
create obligations that are exempt from the overriding effect of the public 
policy in favor of competition. The public policy applies to terms 
expressed in the agreement, terms implied by the agreement, and claims 
derived from equitable principles invoked as a result of the agreement. 
30. A detailed analysis of the development of these two rules can be found in B. Welling, 
Corporate Law in Canada : the Governing Principles, Toronto, Butterworths, 1984, 
p. 378-407. Not everyone agrees that these are, in fact, the rules. However, my purpose 
here is to show how the public policy in favor of competition applies to the accounting 
remedy : having some formulation of the accountability rules makes it easier to do that. 
I think that it will become clear that the analysis can be applied no matter how the rules 
are worded. 
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4.1.2. Practice 
Courts seem to forget about the public policy when ex-employers sue 
former managers on a fiduciary basis for post-employment competition. 
The Supreme Court of Canada's analysis of the Canaero case31 
in 1974 is typical. Two "senior officers" of Canadian Aero Service 
Ltd. (Canaero) headed up a corporate attempt to negotiate a contract 
involving aerial photography and topographical mapping for the govern-
ment of Guyana. They became discontented with various organizational 
problems within Canaero, incorporated Terra Surveys Limited and 
resigned from Canaero. Within four days after their resignations five 
corporations were invited to submit bids on the project : Terra was one of 
them. Terra's bid was accepted. The individual defendants and Terra 
Surveys Limited32 were held accountable to Canaero for their profits from 
the contract. Mr. Justice Laskin explained how33. 
[T]he fiduciary relationship goes at least this far : a director or a senior officer... 
is precluded from obtaining for himself... any property or business advantage 
either belonging to the company or for which it has been negotiating ; and 
especially is this so where the director or officer is a participant in the 
negotiations on behalf of the company. ... [A] director or senior officer... is also 
precluded from so acting even after his resignation where... it was his position 
with the company rather than a fresh initiative that led him to the opportunity 
which he later acquired. ...Although it was contented that O'Malley and 
Zarzycki did not know of the imminence of the approval of the Guyana project, 
their ready run for it, when it was approved at about the time of their resignations 
and at a time when they knew of Canaero's continuing interest, are factors to be 
considered in deciding whether they were still under a fiduciary duty not to seek 
to procure for themselves or for their newly-formed company the business 
opportunity which they has nurtured for Canaero. ... Liability of O'Malley and 
Zarzycki for breach of fiduciary duty does not depend upon proof by Canaero 
that, but for their intervention it would have obtained the Guyana project ; nor is 
it a condition of recovery of damages that Canaero establish what its profit would 
have been or what it has lost by failing to realize the corporate opportunity in 
question. It is entitled to compel the faithless fiduciaries to answer for their 
default according to their gain. 
31. Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley, supra, note 1. 
32. If often happens that a former manager sets up a corporation in competition with an 
ex-employer. The courts rarely explain the basis of the new corporation's account-
ability. Essentially, it works somewhat like the common law tort of inducing breach of 
contract. One who knowingly contributes to a fiduciary's breach of duty incurs 
equitable obligations similar to the fiduciary's. Terra Surveys Limited knowingly 
participated in a scheme that would have made the two former managers accountable, 
and thus became accountable itself. 
33. Canadian Aero Service Lid. v. O'Malley, supra, note 1, p. 606. 
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Note how the analysis is focussed on what Laskin, J. identified as the 
"corporate opportunity". No limits are set on how much profit must be 
accounted for. Did he think that all the profits gained from a "corporate 
opportunity" must be turned over, no matter how long it takes to earn 
them? 
Other courts have taken positions on the corporate opportunity 
bandwagon. 
In Abbey Glen Property Corp. v. Stumborg34, directors of the 
plaintiff corporation negotiated with a third party for a particular business 
deal on behalf of the corporation. The third party was more interested in 
dealing with the individual defendants, so they contracted personally. The 
deal was described as a "corporate opportunity" and the defendants' 
profits were ordered paid to the plaintiff. 
In Moore International (Canada) Inc. v. Carter*5 the facts were 
almost identical to those in Canaero, once it was concluded that of the 
three projects involved only one could be considered a "maturing 
corporate opportunity". The individual defendants, C and R, were 
employed by the plaintiff corporation : C was the general manager 
and R was a senior salesman. Having worked for the plaintiff on a 
potential business project, C and R resigned and joined another 
corporation which successfully contracted for the project. The defendants 
were held accountable for their profit. This time, the reasoning was more 
in line with the two accountability tests set our earlier36. 
[a corporate manager] is entitled after his resignation to assist his new employer 
who is already pursuing a business opportunity which his former employer was 
pursuing provided he does not use information concerning that business 
opportunity obtained during his former employment or his position with his 
former employer to obtain the business for his new employer. 
Note, however, that once again there was no consideration of factors 
external to the equitable relationship between the ex-employer and 
former manager. The analysis suggests that the accounting remedy could 
apply to any amount of profit. 
In Roper v. Murdoch31, the defendants were senior executives who 
attempted to negotiate with a television celebrity on behalf of the plaintiff 
34. Abbey Glen Property Corp. v. Stumborg, (1976) 65 D.L.R. (3d) 235, app. dsmssd. 
(1978), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 35 (Alta. CA.). 
35. Moore International (Canada) Inc. v. Carter, (1982) 40 B.C.L.R. 322, app. dsmssd. 
(1984) 1 C.P.R. (3d) 171 (B.C.C.A.). 
36. Id., p. 344 R. was not a "senior officer", but accountability for his activities seems to 
have been based on his knowing participation in what C, a senior officer and fiduciary, 
was doing. 
37. Roper v. Murdoch, (1987) 39 D.L.R. (4th) 684 (B.C.S.C). 
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corporation. The objective was to produce a television show. No 
agreement was reached. The defendants resigned and set up a new 
corporation, which hired the celebrity and produced the show. They were 
required to account for the profits earned by virtue of their appropriation 
of a "corporate opportunity". 
In Comedy Cottage Inc. v. Berk38, a vice-president of the plaintiff 
corporation informed the corporation that a renewal of its lease had been 
refused. He resigned the same day, subsequently obtained the lease for 
himself, and formed a new comedy club. He was held accountable on the 
following grounds39. 
In determining whether an officer may take advantage of a business opportunity 
in which a corporation is interested, courts consider whether the corporation had 
an interest, actual or in expectancy, in the opportunity and whether the 
acquisition thereof by the officer would hinder or defeat plans and purposes of 
the corporation in carrying on or developing legitimate business for which it was 
created. ... Even assuming arguendo that defendant did not begin competing for 
the lease until after his resignation, defendant remained bound by his fiduciary 
duty because his acquisition of the lease was based upon knowledge acquired 
during his employment. 
There are lots more "corporate opportunity" cases, but these are a 
representative sample. Where the former manager earned a profit, it is 
taken away and given to the ex-employer40. Alternatively, equitable 
damages may be awarded to compensate the ex-employer. Moore 
International (Canada) Inc. v. Carter explained why41. 
In my opinion the plaintiff is not required to elect one remedy or the other. He 
may lead evidence of both his own loss and his fiduciary's profit. And the trial 
judge may then make an award of compensation that is supported by the 
evidence. ...The fiduciary or his accomplice should not be permitted to gain 
from the breach of the fiduciary's obligation of trust and good faith. So, if their 
profit is greater than the loss by the former employer, an accounting is a better 
standard of compensation than damages. But, conversely, the employer should 
38. Comedy Cottage Inc. v. Berk. 495 NE (2d) 1006, (111., 1986). 
39. Id.. p. 1011. 
40. There is, of course, room for argument in every case as to how much of the defendant's 
gross income was attributable to the "corporate opportunity" and how much ofthat can 
be deducted for expenses. The cases often go into great detail on these points. Evidence 
that profits were attributable to superior management by the defendant after his 
resignation, or by other factors not related to what he and the ex-employer were doing 
before he resigned, can also diminish the amount for which he is accountable. If the 
reported cases are typical, the latter point tends to be underplayed by defendants. 
41. Moore International (Canada) Inc. v. Carter, p. 178. Similarly, see CST Inc. v. Mark, 
520 A. (2d) 469 (Pa., 1987), in which a corporate officer was found to have appropriated 
a "corporate opportunity", but made no profit: damages equal to the estimated lost 
profit of the corporation were awarded. 
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not be penalized for any business ineptitude of the fiduciary or his accomplice. 
So, if the loss by the employer is greater than the profit of the fiduciary, damages 
would be the better standard of compensation. It follows that, where the 
evidence will support a sound assessment based on an accounting of profits and 
also a sound assessment based on a calculation of loss, and where, in the 
particular circumstances, both remedies are available and both are supported by 
the pleadings and the evidence, the compensation awarded should be the higher 
of the two. 
Not all accountability cases involve a specific and identifiable 
"corporate opportunity". An ex-employer will sometimes sue a former 
manager who has been soliciting customers he used to deal with in his 
fiduciary capacity. It is often the case that the clients who were solicited 
are still with the former manager at the time of trial. Plaintiffs sometimes 
win. The amount of profits for which former managers are held 
accountable, and the losses for which ex-employers are compensated, are 
difficult to rationalize with any general principle. The following cases are 
typical. 
In Alberts v. Mountjoy42, the defendants were employed by 
an insurance agent, M as general manager and B as a salesman. They 
left. M set up a new agency, employed B, and solicited many of the 
ex-employer's clients. Mr. Justice Estey conceded that "a departing 
servant has the right to compete with his former employer... by 
establishing a business in direct or partial competition and he may bring to 
that business the knowledge and skill directly obtained from the previous 
master in teaching him his business"43. However, M had used a list of 
customers taken from the ex-employer's office. Contrasting this with 
cases in which clients were solicited from memory, and citing several 
English cases, Estey, J. fixed liability on the gound that a former manager 
"is not entitled to make 'an unfair use' of information acquired in the 
course of his employment, nor may he use confidential information so 
acquired"44. Damages were assessed on the basis of loss of sales 
commissions suffered by the ex-employer for 2 years following the 
defendants' resignations. Where the 2 year limitation came from is not 
clear45. 
42. Alberts v. Mountjoy, (1977) 79 DLR (3d) 108 (Ont.). 
43. Id., p. 112. 
44. Id., p. 115. It is unclear what he thought "unfair use" meant or what makes information 
"confidential". 
45. There is a partial explanation at p. 120: 
The evidence further indicated that when insurance agencies, well established 
such as in the plaintiffs case, are sold the purchase price thereof is twice the 
annual commission income. This formula is no doubt a recognition of the frailty 
of the trade connection in this kind of business between agency and client. 
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In WJ. Christie & Co. Ltd. v. Greer46 a former manager left the 
plaintiff corporation, set up a competing insurance business, and solicited 
corporate clients. The issue was phrased in terms of whether the 
solicitation of clients was contrary to a continuing fiduciary responsibility 
owed by the former manager. The judge made a remarkable comment47. 
There is nothing to prevent an ordinary employee from terminating his 
employment, and normally that employee is free to compete with his former 
employer. The right to compete freely may be constrained by contract. ... But it 
is different for a director/officer/key management person who occupies a 
fiduciary position. Upon his resignation and departure, that person is entitled to 
accept business from former clients, but direct solicitation ofthat business is not 
permissible. Having accepted a position of trust, the individual is not entitled to 
allow his own self-interest to collide and conflict with fiduciary responsibilities. 
The direct solicitation traverses the boundary of acceptable conduct. 
The trial judge's assessment of damages for direct solicitation of former 
clients on the basis of one year's gross revenue (with an adjustment for 
overhead costs) was called "fair"48. 
In Dominion High-Rise Ltd. v. Night-Hawk Cleaning & Supply Co. 
Ltd.49 a manager quit and set up a competing business. The judge 
concluded that "while he continued to serve the company as manager... 
he did so with less enthusiasm" : that, of course, suggests a failure to 
comply with fiduciary standards while still employed. There was also 
evidence of customer solicitation before he resigned — which the judge 
called "distasteful", noting that he was "receiving a somewhat con-
siderable salary". Damages were assessed on the basis that what the 
defendant did "destroyed the plaintiff as a viable business entity", so a 
diminution in what the judge called "the value of the corporation" was 
calculated50. 
46. W.J. Christie & Co. Ltd. v. Greer, (1981) 121 D.L.R. (3d) 472 (Man. CA). 
47. Id., p. 477. 
48. Interestingly, the trial judge described his own assessment of damages in a different 
way. "As there was not any positive evidence as to the length of time the plaintiff would 
have retained the customers my decision must be based on interference and 
conjecture" : W.J. Christie & Co. Ltd. v. Greer, (1980) 3 Man. R (2d) 431, p. 434. 
49. Dominion High-Rise Ltd. v. Night-Hawk Clearing & Supply Co. Ltd., (1982) 37 O.R. 
(2d) 148 Ont. 
50. Id., p. 156. He dismissed alternative calculations on the ground that there was 
"insufficient evidence [so] the final figure arrived at, by this route, could only be an 
estimate, which is not good enough." Compare DCF Systems Ltd. v. Gellman (1978), 
41 C.P.R. 2d 145 (Ont.), in which a director breached his fiduciary obligations by failing 
to attempt to prevent key employees from leaving or warning the corporation about their 
imminent departure. He subsequently resigned and joined them in competition against 
the corporation, but it seems clear that the issue was his failure to act while he still held 
his managerial postion. Equitable damages were assessed on the basis of the capitalized 
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In Hawboldt Industries Ltd. v. Chester Basin Hydraulics & Machine 
Ltd.51, four management employees left the plaintiff corporation and set 
up a competing business manufacturing marine equipment. Their direct 
solicitation of the plaintiffs clients was held to be a breach of fiduciary 
obligation : it appears to have been assumed that they remained 
fiduciaries even after resigning52. Liability having been found, the task of 
assessing damages for breach of fiduciary duty was described as 
follows53. 
The measure of damages is based upon the quantum of business actually 
diverted. The former employer has the burden of proving that direct solicitation 
of individuals occurred and the quantum of business that changed hands as a 
result ofthat solicitation. ... If it carries that burden, the Court should then be in 
a position to calculate the quantum of damages. If it does not carry the burden, 
there will probably be little, if any, damages payable. 
Having said that, the judge based damages on the defendant's (not the 
plaintiffs) ratio of gross profit to sales for a period of one year. Net profit 
was estimated at 50 % of that and was further reduced to account for the 
possibility that some of the plaintiffs business might have gone elsewhere 
even without the defendant's actions. 
I can't make out how "damages" became equated with someone 
else's profit. Nor is it clear where the one year limitation came from54. 
White Oak Welding Supplies v. Tapp55 was another case where a 
former manager was assumed to be a fiduciary notwithstanding his 
resignation. The defendant, who was the plaintiffs sales manager and had 
an intimate knowledge of the plaintiffs business and customers, resigned 
value of their work as employee!, diminished by the 75% probability that they would 
have resigned even if the defendant had tried to persuade them to stay. The judge noted, 
at (p. 162-163) : "it is in a high degree unlikely that the plaintiff companies would have 
retained much of the business that flowed to the defendants in the event of a perfectly 
proper resignation and the formation of a new business. ... An assessment based on lost 
revenue therefore does not constitute a realistic approach". 
51. Hawboldt Industries Ltd. v. Chester Basin Hydraulics & Machine Ltd., (1983) 
22B.L.R. 215(N.S). 
52. It is not a matter of advertising to the public or to the trade as a whole ; 
everyone has the right to advertise. What is forbidden is direct solicitation of 
individual customers of the former employer who may direct their business 
from the former employer to the former employees. 
[Id., p. 233] 
53. Id., p. 233. 
54. Similarly, see 309925 Ontario Ltd. v. Tyrrell, (1981) 127 D.L.R. (3d) 99 (Ont.), in which 
the defendant was found not liable for breach of fiduciary obligation. The judge 
estimated that the defendant would have been liable to account for 1 year of profits in 
the event of a different finding. No reason was given for using a one year period. 
55. White Oak Welding Supplies v. Tapp, (1983) 42 O.R. (2d) 445 (Ont.). 
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and entered into competition, soliciting business from among the 
plaintiffs customers. Having concluded that a breach of fiduciary 
obligation had occurred, the judge assessed damages as follows56. 
The amount awarded should, in my view, be based on the demonstrated loss of 
the plaintiff adjusted in several respects. First, ...competition in the welding 
business is very severe and client's accounts, in whole or in part (like hockey 
night in Canada), are constantly being captured and recaptured by the various 
competitors. Secondly, the non-competition agreement which the defendant was 
at one time asked to sign, but which was in fact never executed, had in it a limit 
of one year from the time of resignation as the period during which the defendant 
would not compete. In my view, this furnishes a fair limit to the period during 
which losses should be charged to the defendant, [emphasis added] 
I see. One party once proposed that they agree to a one year term of non-
competition. For whatever reason, they didn't agree. We don't know 
whether such an agreed term would have been a term of their contract or 
whether it would have been in violation of the public policy in favor of 
competition. At any rate, it is difficult to see how the fact that they once 
discussed (but did not agree) such a term has anything to do with 
equitable damages or fiduciary obligation. 
In 57134 Manitoba Ltd. v. Palmer51', the defendant was manager of 
the plaintiffs sales operations. He resigned and joined a competitor, 
taking several other employees with him. The competitor later stopped 
carrying on that aspect of business and helped the defendant set up a retail 
packaging business of his own. Once again we see a court concluding 
(i) that managers continue to be fiduciaries after they resign and 
(ii) former managers can't solicit the ex-employer's clients58. The judge 
made the following observation on the assessment of damages59. 
I do not think it is possible to arrive at an accurate mathematical calculation of 
the plaintiffs damages. Instead, damages should be assessed, but they should be 
assessed with reference to the trends shown by the accounting evidence. This is 
not a case like Canadian Aero v. O'Malley, where a single specific business 
opportunity was wrongfully obtained from the plaintiff. The repeating nature of 
56. Id., p. 451. 
57. 57134 Manitoba Ltd. v. Palmer, (1985) 7 C.P.R. (3d) 477 (B.C.). 
58. Absent a restrictive covenant, a mere employee may quit and go to work in 
competition with his former employer with few restrictions upon what he may 
do. By contrast, a former employee who held a management position owes a 
fiduciary duty to the former employer even after his employment is terminated 
and is more restricted in what he may do. 
[Id., p. 481] Similarly, see Lacey and Lacey (Alex) Insurance Ltd. v. Stoyles, (1986) 
59 Nfld. & P.E.I. R. 181 (Nfld.), another case involving the insurance business in which 
a former manager was assumed to remain a fiduciary and was held liable for soliciting 
former clients from memory. 
59. Id., p. 495. 
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the plaintiffs business from year to year and the vagaries of commerce and 
customer connection require that damages be assessed rather than calculated. 
And 5 years of estimated lost revenue was ordered paid to the plaintiff 
(plus 4 months of projected future losses) !60 
Finally, in Quantum Management Services Ltd. v. Hann61, the 
defendants were managers in the plaintiffs personnel placement busi-
ness. They had agreed to a restrictive covenant about future competition, 
but it was ruled not to be a contractual term because it violated the public 
policy in favor of competition. This led to some interesting (though, in my 
view, inaccurate) comments about the distinctions between contractual 
and equitable obligations62. The period of time used for calculating 
damages was described as follows63. 
The next question is as to the period of time the fiduciary duty extended not to 
have commercial dealings with former Quantum clients. This question admits of 
no fixed answer—it is judgmental. In the circumstances of this case, particularly 
given the exclusive rights Hann and Taafe had with respect to their clients, 
I have determined that 9 months is the appropriate period. 
I have fixed this period slightly longer than I otherwise would have in light of the 
unique relationship Quantum placement directors had with the personnel 
contacts of their clients. Otherwise, I would have fixed the period of 
disqualification at six months. 
60. This, despite the judge's acknowledgment that "1 am to balance the need of a company 
to impose a fiduciary duty upon its management employees recognized in Canaero 
against the need of the individual to earn a living after he leaves the employer, and the 
need of society to have that individual in productive employment". [Id., p. 484.] Five 
years is a long time. 
61. Quantum Management Services Ltd. v. Hann, (1989) 69 O.R. (2d) 26 (Ont.). 
62. The common law adhered to the nineteenth century ideal of economic laissez-
faire and promoted the value of free competition in the area of employer-
employee relationships. It did so by finding most employment contracts with 
terms prohibiting post-employment competition invalid as being unreasonable 
restraints on free trade. ... Following the fusion (sic) of law and equity, the 
common law (sic) developed exceptions that favoured employers as opposed to 
employees. These exceptions are founded on the equitable concept of fairness 
and place fiduciary duties on departing employees not to compete with their 
former employers in prescribed circumstances. The first notable exception lies 
in the area of trade connections. The former employee may not solicit any 
customer whose name is contained on a list which the employee has taken from 
the employer. 
[Id., at p. 33.] 
63. Id., p. 35. Also, on p. 34 the judge noted that the "senior employee rubric applies to 
both Hann and Taaffe so as to preclude both of them from soliciting 'their' former 
clients at least for a reasonable period of time after leaving Quantum." The actual 
calculation was done by taking a percentage of the defendant's sales figures for the nine 
months and reducing the result by a further percentage to account for the possibility that 
some sales might not have been made by Quantum. 
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In sum, the cases are all over the map on accounting for profits and 
equitable damages. The public policy in favor of competition is rarely 
mentioned as a limiting factor : even when it is adverted to, it is not used. 
4.2. The errors in the practice 
The courts have made two critical errors in analyzing the account-
ability of former fiduciaries who compete in business. 
One error is to treat "corporate opportunities" as if they were 
property. They aren't. Yet note the words Bora Laskin used to describe 
the concept in 197464. 
[A] director or a senior officer... is precluded from obtaining for himself, either 
secretly or without the approval of the company... any property or business 
advantage either belonging to the company or for which it has been negotiating. 
... What emerges from a review of the American case law is an imprecise ethical 
standard "which prohibits an executive... from appropriating to himself a 
business opportunity which in fairness should belong to the corporation". 
It is notoriously difficult to figure out exactly what Bora Laskin meant in 
his reasons for judgment. Maybe he didn't intend later judges to conclude 
that he was advocating a property approach with his "corporate 
opportunity" doctrine. But they have certainly adopted his language65. 
What courts are trying to describe with this recently fashionable label 
is nothing more than a potential business deal the corporation was 
working on. Potential is the key word. A corporate manager may well 
breach his fiduciary duty if he does not do his utmost to consummate the 
potential deal66 ; a former corporate manager may well be accountable if 
he takes advantage of information absorbed by virtue of his fiduciary 
position and undermines the potential advantage to the corporation by 
making a deal hor himself67. But it is misleading to say that he "acquired" 
64. Canadian Aero Service Lid. v. O'Malley, supra, note 1. 
65. I have already set out several of the subsequent Canadian cases. American courts are 
more explicit, relying on the same American precedents as the Canaero case. See, for 
example. Comedy Cottage, Inc. v. Berk, supra, note 38 at p. 1011, for the following 
novel conception of property. "It must be recognized that at least initially the Comedy 
Cottage possessed a protectable property interest in the expectancy that the lease of its 
place of business would be renewed. The acquisition of a lease of the premises by 
defendants hindered corporate plans to utilize the goodwill and public patronage built up 
during its many years of operation at the same location. Thus Berk had a duty to refrain 
from acquiring the lease at the expense of the corporation." 
66. That was the basis of liability in I.D.C. v. Cooley, supra, note 23. 
67. See the second of the two accountability principles set out above, under heading 4.1 
"The rule". Accountability may result even if there clearly was no harm to the 
corporation : see Boardmun v. Phipps, supra, note 24. 
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the information or "appropriated" the potential deal. Such terminology is 
useful in everyday speech, particularly where its emotive appeal is likely 
to help achieve some political end; but it will not do in legal analysis 
because "acquired" and "appropriate" are property words applicable 
only to proprietary claims. Mr. Justice Sopinka recently reminded us of 
the danger of assuming that because information is useful it must be 
protected by property rules68. 
[A] man who thinks of a mechanical conception and then communicates it to 
others for the purpose of their working out means of carrying it into effect does 
not, because the idea was his (assuming that it was) get proprietary rights 
equivalent to those of a patentee. Apart from such rights as may flow from the 
fact, for example, of the idea being of a secret process communicated in 
confidence or from some contract of partnership or agency or the like which he 
may enter into with his collaborator, the originator of the idea gets no proprietary 
rights out of the mere circumstances that he first thought of it. 
It doesn't matter whether the courts are really applying a property 
analysis or whether they simply see potential business deals as "sort of 
like" property69. What matters is what they don't do. They don't limit 
accountability in any principled way. The reason may be their "sort of 
like" property orientation. Recall an earlier conclusion: property 
occupies a special place in the common law system ; an ex-employer can 
protect property, however acquired, but former employees who compete 
without interfering with the ex-employer's property are protected by the 
public policy in favor of competition. Thus, most former employees are at 
liberty to resign and use their skills and knowledge to compete. Any 
limitation on that liberty, whether an agreed limitation between the 
parties or a limitation based on equitable principles, is subject to the 
public policy in favor of competition. The "corporate opportunity" 
doctrine is one such limitation. Not being based on property, it is not 
exempt. 
68. International Corona Resources Ltd. v. LAC Minerals Ltd, supra, note 3, p. 81 per 
Sopinka, J., quoting from Lord Evershed in Nichrotherm Electrical Co. v. Percy, [1957] 
R.P.C. 207 (Eng.), p. 209. 
69. Known, of course, as "quasi-property" to those common lawyers who prefer packaging 
and labelling to serious thought. Judges are inclined to the picturesque when trying to 
describe what they mean. See, for example, White's, J. description in Re Berkey Photo 
(Canada) Ltd. v Ohlit, (1983) 43 O.R. (2d) 518 (Ont.), p. 531. 
There must also be the acquisition of a business opportunity or advantage 
which was available to the employer and not readily available to the 
competition. An example is afresh corporate opportunity which has developed 
to a point where it is about to ripen. In that situation, if the employee quits so 
as to pick the fruit of the opportunity personally his conduct is improper and 
gives rise to liability. 
Other cases talk of the ex-employer "losing the contract", as if the business deal they 
were trying to arrange had been finalized before the former manager resigned. 
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The second critical error that emerges from cases in this area is the 
notion that a corporate manager's fiduciary duty continues to apply even 
after he resigns his fiduciary position. Again, this conclusion was 
extrapolated from the Canaero case70. But consider what the judges are 
saying. Does it make any sense that someone would owe fiduciary 
obligations today because he occupied a fiduciary position yesterday (or 
last week) ? Mr. Justice Sopinka recently opened the door to an attack 
on this notion of lingering fiduciary obligation. His refreshingly well-
reasoned analysis in International Corona Resources Ltd.. c. LAC 
Minerals Ltd. invites a serious reconsideration of how former managers 
become accountable71. 
Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation have been imposed seem to possess 
three general characteristics : 
(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power. 
(2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to 
affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests. 
(3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary 
holding the discretion or power. 
It is possible for a fiduciary relationship to be found although not all of these 
characteristics are present, nor will the presence of these ingredients invariably 
identify the existence of a fiduciary relationship. ...The one feature, however, 
which is considered to be indispensable to the existence of the relationship, and 
which is most relevant in this case, is that of dependency or vulnerability. ...This 
condition of dependency moves equity to subject the fiduciary to its strict 
standards of conduct. Two caveats must be issued. First, the presence of 
conduct that incurs the censure of a court of equity in the context of a fiduciary 
duty cannot of itself create the duty. ... Second, applying the same principle, the 
fact that confidential information is obtained and misused cannot itself create a 
fiduciary obligation. ...In my opinion, both the trial Judge and the Court of 
Appeal erred in coming to the conclusion that a fiduciary relationship existed 
between Corona and LAC. 
The connection between a "condition of dependency" and fiduciary 
obligation warrants further exploration. An armed bank robber doesn't 
70. See, for example, B. Love Ltd. v. Bulk Steel & Salvage Ltd. (No. 2). (1982) 40 O.R. 
(2d) 1 (Ont.), p. 5 per Gray, J. : "fiduciary obligations of a director or senior officer of a 
corporation may extend in time beyond the resignation or removal of an individual as a 
director or employee: Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley and Dialadex 
Communications Inc. v. Crammond et al.. (1987) 57 O.R. (2d) 746 (Ont.), p. 753: 
"Canaero makes it clear that the duty survives the employment". 
71. International Corona Ressources Ltd. v. LAC Minerals Ltd.. supra, note 3, p. 67-69 per 
Sopinka, J., quoting in part from Wilson, J. in Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 
(Ont.). Casual readers of the report may note that Sopinka, J. is listed as dissenting in 
the case, but on the issue whether there was a fiduciary duty Mclntyre and Lamer, 
JJ. agreed with him to form a majority of the five judges who heard the case. Liability 
was found by a differently constituted majority on other grounds. 
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owe fiduciary obligations to the bank teller at the other end of the gun. 
Kidnappers don't owe fiduciary obligations merely because they can 
physically overpower their trussed up captives. A fiduciary is someone in 
a position of legally condoned power72 who can affect the legal position of 
someone else73 by legal means and who, for those reasons, is obliged to 
consider the best interests ofthat other person before doing so. Corporate 
managers fit that description ; former corporate managers don't. That's 
why corporate managers fall within one of the traditional categories of 
fiduciaries, but former corporate managers don't. 
What corporate managers sometimes do, however, while in the 
process of becoming former corporate managers (ie. immediately prior to 
resigning) is yield to temptation. A manager contemplating resigning may, 
for example, conclude that it is impossible to convince a potential 
customer to conclude a business deal with the corporation74, or may not 
work as hard as he could to close the deal75 : a fiduciary who finds himself 
in such a situation of conflict between self-interest and fiduciary duty and 
72. Mr. Justice Sopinka also touched on this point in International Corona Resources Ltd. 
v. LAC Minerals Ltd., supra, note 3, p. 66, quoting in part from Southin, J. in Girardet 
v. Crease & Co., (1987) 11 B.C.L.R (2d) 361 (B.C.). 
The word "fiduciary" is flung around now as if it applied to all breaches of 
duty by solicitors, directors of companies and so forth. But "fiduciary" comes 
from the Latin "fiducia" meaning "trust". Thus, the adjective "fiduciary" 
means of or pertaining to a trustee or trusteeship. That a lawyer can commit a 
breach of the special duty of a trustee, eg. ... by entering into a contract with 
the client without full disclosure... is clear. But to say that simple carelessness 
in giving advice is such a breach is a perversion of words. ... When the court is 
dealing with one of the traditional relationships, the characteristics or criteria 
for a fiduciary relationship are assumed to exist. In special circumstances, if 
they are shown to be absent, the relationship itself will not suffice. Conversely, 
when confronted with a relationship that does not fall within one of the 
traditional categories, it is essential that the Court consider: what are the 
essential ingredients of a fiduciary relationship and are they present ?" 
73. Suppose corporations A and B were bidding on a project. Corporation A, by submitting 
a more attractive proposal, will succeed in contracting for the project. That will affect 
what the legal position of corporation B "might have been in the future" had 
corporation B managed to conclude a contract for the project. But it certainly does not 
affect the legal position of corporation B in the way meant in the analysis of fiduciary 
obligations. Builders of better mousetraps don't owe fiduciary obligations to those to 
whose doors the public no longer beats a path. 
74. That was what the manager decided in I.D.C. v. Cooley, supra, note 23 : he was found 
accountable. This reasoning would also account for the decision in Abbey Glen Property 
Corp, v. Stumborg, supra, note 34, one of the "corporate opportunity" cases. 
75. This was probably a factor in the Canaero case. It would also apply to at least two of the 
"corporate opportunity" cases set out earlier, Moore International (Canada) Inc. v. 
Carter, supra, note 35 and Comedy Cottage Inc. v. Berk, supra, note 38. An early 
example of this type of situation was Cook v. Deeks, [1916] 1 A.C. 554 (Ont., J.C.P.C.). 
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who later makes a profit which he might not have made but for that 
situation is made to account for the profit, regardless whether he was still 
a fiduciary at the time the profit was made. Alternatively, and regardless 
whether such conflict of duty and self-interest arose76, if a fiduciary in the 
course of performing his fiduciary duties encounters an opportunity to 
make a profit and later makes a profit that he probably would not have 
made but for that opportunity, he too is made to account for the profit, 
regardless whether he was still a fiduciary at the time the profit was made. 
The accountability rule serves to remove the temptation to exploit a 
fiduciary position. The purpose of taking the profit away is, as noted 
earlier, primarily pour encourager les autres. 
On this view of the accountability rule there is no need to pretend 
that former corporate managers are still fiduciaries. Nor is there any 
reason to pretend that potential business deals ("corporate opportun-
ities") are property. We simply are taking a profit away from a former 
fiduciary in order to help other fiduciaries perform their equitable 
obligations. 
There remains one obvious question : by what rules does our legal 
system limit the accountability of former fiduciaries, in particular former 
corporate managers. One often forgotten rule evolved from the public 
policy in favor of competition. 
4.3. Applying the rule 
The rule is exactly the same as in contracts, but it must be applied 
differently in Equity. 
The rule can be stated as follows : the degree to which a former 
corporate manager can be made accountable for profits in Equity, or for 
equitable damages, is limited in geographical area and time ; it must be 
"reasonable between the parties and with reference to the public 
interest"77. 
76. It is the "potential" for conflict that matters: the equitable accounting rule is 
prophylactic in design. Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, supra, note 23 and Boardman 
v. Phipps, supra, note 24, both resulted in an accounting of profits despite the fact that 
there was no real conflict. Roper v. Murdoch, supra, note 37, might also be explained on 
that basis. 
77. The quote is from Elsley v. J.G. Collins Ins. Agencies, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 916, p. 923. It 
was, of course, said with reference to agreed terms between the parties (see supra, 
note 9). I simply take the position that the same principle applies in contract and Equity 
and am content to have others apply what follows to any alternative statements of the 
rule. 
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The rule must be applied differently in Equity because the issue is 
subtly different. A contracts case and an equitable accounting case start 
out with the same two basic questions : (i) does the former corporate 
manager owe the ex-employer money, and (ii) how much ? The second 
question is moot unless the answer to the first is yes. 
In a contracts case, the answer to the first question depends on the 
parties' contract. The answer obviously will be no if the parties did not 
put a term restricting competition in their agreement ; even if there is an 
agreed term, it will not be a term of the contract if it violates the public 
policy in favor of competition. In short, the public policy issue is brought 
up by the first, not the second question. 
In an equitable accounting case, the answer to the first question 
depends on proof that a conflict between self-interest and the former 
fiduciary duty led to the situation in which the profit was made or proof 
that the opportunity to make the profit can be attributed to the fiduciary 
position formerly occupied78. The public policy in favor of competition 
has nothing to do with either of those two issues. If it is determined that 
the former manager is accountable for profits, or owes equitable damages, 
the second question (how much ?) must be answered. In short, in 
equitable accounting and equitable damages cases the public policy issue 
is brought up by the second question, not the first. 
That makes a big difference. In a contracts case the ex-employer gets 
what the contract says. If it says no competition for six months in a 
particular city, the former manager must pay damages for any competi-
tion in violation ofthat term : no more is owed. If it says nothing, because 
an agreed term was struck out for violating the public policy, no damages 
are payable. However, in an equitable accounting or equitable damages 
case, the amount payable is the maximum allowed by the public policy in 
favor of competition. 
An example will illustrate how this changes what a judge must do. 
Suppose a former manager made ten years of profits competing across 
Canada and has been found accountable. For how much of the profit is he 
accountable7 Assuming that Canada is too large a geographical area and 
ten years is too long a time, the judge now must decide exactly how large 
an area and how long a time is allowed. There is no gray area as there was 
78. See, supra, section 4.1. "The rule". I appreciate that some variation in the wording of 
the rules is required to handle equitable damages cases in which a former corporate 
manager would have been held accountable had he made a profit, or where his profit is 
less than the ex-employer's proven losses. That, however, is peripheral to the public 
policy point being made. 
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in the contracts case79. If the judge determines that everything that was 
done outside Quebec and after 3.5 years was protected by the public 
policy in favor of competition, the former manager is accountable only for 
the first 3.5 years of profits earned in Quebec. 
That could require more detailed lawyerly analysis of the public 
policy in favor of competition. 
4.4. Summary : fiduciary obligation and public policy 
Way back in 1974 the Ontario Court of Appeal made the following 
on 
comment . 
Fairness is the touchstone of equitable justice, and when the test of fairness is 
not met, the equitable jurisdiction of the Court can be invoked to prevent or 
remedy the injustice which misrepresentation or other dishonesty has caused. 
The category of cases in which fiduciary duties and obligations arise is not a 
closed one. 
The comment has been repeated too often. They were wrong, We can 
only hope that the Supreme Court of Canada, while sorting out the legal 
affairs of LAC and Corona81, has managed to stop the trendy nonsense by 
which every bit of corporate or professional nastiness became labelled a 
breach of fiduciary obligation. 
In the brave new world where "t'ain't fair" no longer suffices and 
when fiduciary obligations are more carefully thought out, I trust that 
some serious thought will be given to limiting the accountability of 
former fiduciaries. Corporate managers who resign and compete with 
their ex-employers are former fiduciaries. Their accountability is limited 
by the public policy in favor of competition. 
79. See the concluding paragraph under section 3.3. "Applying the rule", supra. 
80. Goldex Mines Ltd. v. Revill, (1974) 7 O.R. (2d) 216, p. 224, 54 D.L.R. 672 (Ont. CA.), 
obiter (always obiter !). 
81. Supra, note 70. 
